In this paper, we present free-start collisions for the TIB3 hash function with a complexity of about 2 32 compression function evaluations. By using message modification techniques the complexity can be further reduced to 2 24 . Furthermore, we show how to construct collisions for TIB3 slightly faster than brute force search using the fact that we can construct several (different) free-start collisions for the compression function. The complexity to construct collisions is about 2 122.5 for TIB3-256 with similar memory requirements. The attack shows that compression function attacks have been underestimated in the design of TIB3. Although the practicality of the proposed attacks might be debatable, they nevertheless exhibit non-random properties that are not present in the SHA-2 family.
Introduction
A hash functions maps an input of arbitrary finite length to an output of a fixed length. An important basic security requirements for a cryptographic hash function is its collision resistance -it should be computationally infeasible to find two different inputs, which hash to the same output. Recently, the collision resistance of many commonly used hash functions has been broken or doubted. Therefore, NIST has started the SHA-3 competition [7] to find a successor of the SHA-1 and SHA-2 hash functions. The cryptanalysis of the proposed SHA-3 candidates is of high importance to find a valuable hash function which is fast but still secure within the next few decades.
Many new and interesting hash functions have been proposed and some of these algorithms have a remarkable speed on certain platforms. The SHA-3 candidate TIB3 [6] is one of the fastest submissions with a speed of about 6-8 cycles/byte for all output sizes on 64-bit platforms [3] . The main design idea behind TIB3 is to use extensive parallelism by designing a "shorter" but "wider" compression function. To strengthen this short but fast compression function and to counter differential attacks, each message block is used in two subsequent compression function calls. However, in this paper we show that it is still possible to construct collisions for the hash function TIB3 below the generic complexity.
Using high-probability iterative characteristics, we can construct many practical free-start collisions for the compression function of TIB3 (Sect. 3). These free-start collisions are then used for the collision attacks on both TIB3-256 (Sect. 4) with a complexity slightly below the birthday bound. In the following section, we first give a short description of the hash function TIB3.
Description of TIB3
The hash function TIB3 is an iterated hash function based on the Merkle-Damgård design principle [1, 5] . The two main instances of TIB3 are called TIB3-256 and TIB3-512. TIB3-256 processes message blocks of 512 bits and produces hash values of 224 or 256 bits, while TIB3-512 processes message blocks of 1024 bits and produces hash values of 384 or 512 bits. If the message length is not a multiple of the block size, an unambiguous padding method is applied. For the description of the padding method we refer to [6] . Let m = M 1 M 2 · · · M t be a t-block message (after padding). Then, the hash value h = H(m) is computed as follows:
where IV H and IV M are predefined initial values. The compression function f is used in Davies-Meyer mode [4] and consist of 2 parts: the key schedule and the state update transformation.
Key Schedule. The key schedule (or message expansion) of TIB3 takes as input the current and previous message block to compute a 4096-bit key for TIB3-256 and a 8192-bit key for TIB3-512. This key is split into 16 roundkeys k j , where each roundkey is used in round j of the state update transformation. For a detailed description of the key schedule function we refer to [6] , since we do not need it in our analysis. In the following, we describe the state update transformation for TIB3-256 and TIB3-512 in more detail.
State Update Transformation. The state update transformation of TIB3-256 starts from a (fixed) initial value IV H of four 64-bit words and updates them in 16 rounds each. In each round one 256-bit roundkey k j is used to update the four state variables A, C, E and G as follows:
where Sbox is a 3-bit S-box, P HT X is a bit-mixing function and 32 denotes a 32-bit modular additions. For the definition of the S-boxes we refer to [6] . The function O = P HT X(I) is defined as follows:
After the last round of the state update transformation, the chaining values A 0 , C 0 , E 0 , G 0 are XORed with the output values of the last round A 16 , C 16 , E 16 , F 16 (feed-forward), resulting in the final value of one compression function f . For a detailed description of the hash function we refer to [6] .
Free-Start Collisions for TIB3-256
In this section, we present a free-start collision attack on the compression function of TIB3-256 with a complexity of about 2 24 compression function evaluations. Note that we use only differences in the chaining inputs and no differences in the message inputs are allowed. This is similar to the attack of den Boer and Bosselaers on MD5 [2] . However, in the case of TIB3 the complexity of the attack is much better due to its short compression function.
The attack is based on the fact that we can construct several 1-round iterative characteristics for the compression function of TIB3-256 with a probability between 2 −2 and 2 −4 , depending on the bit position of the differences. The 1-round characteristic is shown below:
where ∆[i] denotes a difference at bit position i. By subsequently using this 1-round characteristic Si \ So 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1
On the Probability of the Characteristic
Before we describe the probability of the 1-round characteristic in detail, we first have a look at the differential probabilities of the S-box. Table 1 , shows the probabilities for all input/output differences of the 3-bit S-box of TIB3. Table 2 . Shows the differential characteristic for one round of TIB3. The output differences of the respective functions at bit position i of A, C, E and G are marked by "x". Probabilities are in base 2 logarithms.
prob. for i at step
Now, lets take a closer look at the probability of the characteristic for each round j which is shown in Table 2 . Note that the xor of the roundkey in each round never changes the difference. In the following, we describe this 1-round characteristic in detail.
-We start with the differences ∆[i] in C, E and G. After the first xor operation, the difference in G is canceled. In order to guarantee that the characteristic holds, we need that the differences ∆[i] in C and E at the input of the S-box propagate to the differences ∆[i] in A and E after the S-box. This holds with a probability of 2 −2 , see Table 1 . The characteristic holds for one round with a probability of 2 −2 for i = {32, 64} and 2 −4 for i = {32, 64} and we get a characteristic for all 16 rounds with a probability of 2 −32 and 2 −64 , respectively. Thus, we can construct a free-start collision for the compression function of TIB3-256 with a complexity of about 2 32 for i = {32, 64} and 2 64 for i = {32, 64} instead of 2 128 as expected for a compression function with 256 bits. An example for a free-start collision for TIB3-256 with i = 64 is given in Table 3 . Table 3 . A free-start collision for TIB3-256 with differences at bit position 64.
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Improving the Attack Complexity
The complexity of the attack can be significantly improved by using message modification techniques. Message modification was introduced by Wang et al. in the cryptanalysis of MD5 and SHA-1 [9, 10] . The idea of message modification is to use the degrees of freedom one has in the choice of the message words to fulfill conditions on the chaining variables. In the case of TIB3-256 we have 1024 bit input from two message blocks which can be used for message modification. It is easy to see from the message expansion (key schedule), that each of the message blocks can be used straight-forward to fulfill all conditions on the chaining variables in the first 4 rounds. In other words, we do not care about the probability of the characteristic in this part, since a message following the characteristic in the first 4 rounds can be found deterministically. Hence, the complexity of the attack can be reduced to 2 24 for i = {32, 64} and to 2 48 for i = {32, 64}. We expect that the complexity can be further improved by using more sophisticated message modification techniques.
Collision Attack for TIB3-256
In this section, we show how the free-start collision attack on the compression function can be extended to a collision attack on the hash function. Even though the complexity of the attack is only slightly faster than a generic birthday attack, it exhibits some non-random properties that are not present in SHA-256. The attack uses the fact, that we can find several high-probability free-start collision producing characteristics for the compression function of TIB3-256.
Increasing the Number of Free-Start Collisions
In the previous section, we have constructed 64 different free-start collisions for i = 1, . . . , 64. To increase the number of characteristics, we can fit two high probability characteristics with bit position i = j into the compression function:
In the case of i = {32, 64}, we get a total probability of 2 128 which can be reduced to 2 96 by message modification. Note that we can further increase the number of characteristics by allowing carries at the beginning (first rounds) and end (last rounds). Hence, we can construct at least 2 11 different free-start collision characteristics.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have presented free-start collisions for TIB3 with a complexity of about 2 32 compression function evaluations. By using message modification techniques the complexity can be reduced to 2 24 . Furthermore, we can construct at least 2 11 free-start collision producing characteristics for TIB3-256. We show how to use these free-start collisions to construct collisions slightly faster than brute force search. The attack has a complexity of about 2 122.5 compression function evaluations and similar memory requirements. Memoryless variants to find (specific) near-collisions might be able to improve the memory requirements of this attack significantly.
TIB3 is one of the fastest submissions due to its parallelism but short compression function. In the design of TIB3, compression function attacks have been underestimated. In this paper, we have shown how to find high-probability free-start collisions and turn them into an attack on the hash function. Although the practicality of the proposed attacks might be debatable, they nevertheless exhibit non-random properties that are not present in the SHA-2 family. Since there is still room for improvements, this analysis can be a starting point for future attacks on TIB3.
